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Urban governanceThis paper analyzes the recent ﬁscal crisis among villages in the city of Dongguan. The city has been an
exemplar of export-oriented growth in China. Rapid economic development has been attributed to local
state entrepreneurial governance based on a close relationship between the local state and enterprises.
However, this development approach has led to a severe ﬁscal crisis, especially at the village level, due
to declining rental incomes, ineffective village governance and a heavy burden of public service expen-
diture following the global ﬁnancial crisis. This paper examines the conﬁguration of local governance
and how an economic crisis has evolved into a public ﬁnance crisis in the city. Until now the limits of
entrepreneurial governance have been understood only with regard to negative social impacts. This paper
reveals the limits of a developmental approach.
 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an openaccess article under the CCBY license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).Introduction
The global ﬁnancial crisis in 2008 triggered a series of chain
reactions across the world. The impact of globalization on the local
economy may be seen in the city of Dongguan, the heartland of
export-oriented economies in the Pearl River Delta. Under the
export-driven economy, the Pearl River Delta experienced
export-driven urbanization, or so-called ‘exo-urbanization’ (Lin,
1997; Shen, Feng, & Wong, 2006; Sit & Yang, 1997), which trans-
formed rural areas through bottom-up and spontaneous urbaniza-
tion (McGee, Lin, Wang, Marton, & Wu, 2011; Shen, Wong, & Feng,
2002). The remarkable economic development of China’s rural
areas has been attributed to a particular mode of ‘entrepreneurial
governance’ based on the legacy of state socialism and the intro-
duction of market mechanisms, known as ‘local state corporatism’.
The concept was initially developed by Oi (1992, 1999), and it pro-
vides a powerful paradigm to explain Chinese rural takeoff. In large
cities such as Beijing and Shanghai, the so-called ‘state entrepre-
neurialism’ became a powerful driver for the development of
new towns and spatial restructuring (Wu & Phelps, 2011).The entrepreneurial state (Duckett, 1998) seems to be very
effective in the Yangtze River delta and Shanghai (Chien, 2008,
2013; Wu, 2003) but its limitation has not been fully assessed
(DiGaetano & Strom, 2003), in particular in the areas that experi-
enced more bottom-up urbanization processes. While the process
of economic restructuring had started before the global ﬁnancial cri-
sis (Ma & Wu, 2005), the crisis exacerbated the collapse of the rural
economy, which had until then been based on rental incomes and
was supported by the governance of local corporatism. Although
the crisis had serious impacts on rural migrant workers, the implica-
tions for the Chinese city have so far not been fully examined.
This paper examines village debt in Dongguan after the global
ﬁnancial crisis. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.
Section ‘Theoretical frameworks: forms of entrepreneurial gover-
nance’ reviews the relevant theoretical framework, especially the
concept of entrepreneurial governance. Section ‘Research method-
ology’ introduces the methodological issues of this study. Section
‘The development stage of entrepreneurial governance in Dong-
guan’ discusses the development of entrepreneurial governance
in Dongguan. Section ‘The creation of an economic crisis – declin-
ing rental incomes’ discusses the local economic crisis after the
global ﬁnancial crisis. Section ‘Public service spending under entre-
preneurial governance’ then examines public spending and village
debts. Section ‘From an economic crisis to ﬁscal crisis: village debt’
discusses how the economic crisis has led to the ﬁscal crisis in
Dongguan. Section ‘Conclusion’ concludes and reﬂects on the limit
of entrepreneurial governance.
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In this section, the theoretical framework of entrepreneurial
governance is presented. First, the concept is discussed with refer-
ence to thewestern literature; then, the study of rural China and the
unique form of governance is reviewed. There are different mani-
festations of local governance, according to national different
national contexts: managerial, corporatist, pro-growth, and welfare
governance models. The concept of entrepreneurial governance
here refers to a speciﬁc form of network that combines the govern-
ment with the local business community (Pierre, 1999). Local gov-
ernance has different forms in different countries (DiGaetano &
Strom, 2003). Political economic studies focus on the transforma-
tion of the state (Harvey, 1989) and urban entrepreneurialism
(Jessop & Sum, 2000), and the pro-growth development politics
known as the ‘growth machine’ (Logan & Molotch, 1987; Molotch,
1993). In studies of Chinese urban and rural development, there
are two different but related kinds: one on urban entrepreneurial-
ism and the other on rural ‘local corporatism’ (Oi, 1992). More
recent development in local entrepreneurial governance has been
highlighted by a wide ranging body of literature on urban China
(Chien, 2008, 2013; Smart & Lin, 2007; Tao, Su, Liu, & Cao, 2010;
Wu, 2003; Yang, 2007; Ye & Wu, 2014). But this body of literature
is mainly developed in larger cities or the places with strong local
states. This section will review these two bodies of literature.
Entrepreneurial urban governance
In contrast to the limited number of studies on rural areas, the
growth of Chinese cities has been under intensive study (Ma,
2002). Explanation is more aligned with the development of entre-
preneurial urban governance, as described above. For example,
Duckett (1998) discussed thedriver of real estate andhow this chan-
ged the nature of the local state in China. Echoing the thesis of the
change frommanagerialism to entrepreneurialism in Western cap-
italism (Harvey, 1989), and the growthmachine which describes an
urbanpolitics drivenby locally bounded interests inproperty (Logan
& Molotch, 1987; Molotch, 1993), researchers found the aggressive
promotion of land and housing development (Hsing, 2006; Wu,
2003) and a politics characterized by growth-oriented coalitions
between the local government and real estate developers
(Duckett, 1998). For example, Tao et al. (2010) and Ye and Wu
(2014) discussed how local government under ﬁscal incentives uses
land development to promote economic competitiveness. This
explanation mainly resorts to the notion of a ‘land revenue regime’
in which the local state aims to gain revenue from land and infra-
structure development to make up the ﬁscal deﬁcit under the tax-
sharing system. The evidence of empirical research on land dynam-
ics and urban expansion is strong (Ye & Wu, 2014). In the Yangtze
River Delta, entrepreneurial governance is seen in administrative
annexation by the central city to expand its jurisdiction and foster
economic competitiveness (Zhang & Wu, 2006), while in the Pearl
River Delta (PRD) the city of Guangzhou strove to improve its image
and develop mega-projects to attract investment (Xu & Yeh, 2005).
The export-oriented development model used in the PRD has con-
fronted with serious problems since the implementation of indus-
trial upgrading strategy designated by Guangdong Provincial
government prior and after the 2008 global ﬁnancial crisis. The fail-
ure of entrepreneurial governance has been be demonstrated by the
emerging tension between various levels of governments (Yang,
2012), which has triggered the ﬁscal crisis in Dongguan.
Local corporatism in rural China
From the studies of rural China, a speciﬁc form of entrepreneur-
ial governance has been identiﬁed. It must be noted, however, thatrural development in China comprises different types. The Sunan
model represents strong local collectivism (Chien, 2008; Shen &
Ma, 2005; Wei, 2002), whereas Wenzhou has seen an entirely dif-
ferent model, which is more based on individual entrepreneurs and
family businesses (Wei, Li, & Wang, 2007). The rural areas in the
Pearl River Delta represent weaker local government (at the city
and county levels), but stronger village governance based on family
ties and clans (Lin, 1997, 2006; Shen et al., 2002). Overseas invest-
ment in Dongguan presents a characteristic of smaller investors
than in Suzhou (Yang, 2007), reﬂecting the different development
approaches: the former is more towards households and villages
while the latter is organized by cities and counties.
For rural China, the concept of local state corporatism initially
developed by Oi (1992, 1999) provides a powerful paradigm of
explanation. It describes the close relations between the local state
and enterprises. In fact, the local state, according to this explana-
tion, uses ﬁnancial resources to set up enterprises that are under
its control so that it can beneﬁt from the proﬁt of these enterprises.
The explanation was largely developed from the context of Chinese
rural areas. The explanation is based on ﬁscal decentralization,
which incentivized the local state in economic development
(Walder, 1995). The local state (counties, towns, and villages)
directly participated in local economic development. The local
state at the county level uses its power to mobilize capital and
resources to support rural industrialization. At the village level,
the thesis of local state corporatism argues that because the village
was not a layer of government it acted more like a ﬁrm in the local
governance. The explanation points to the institutional source of
rural industrialization in the role of the local state. In the Chinese
context, the legitimacy of the state and its authoritarian tradition
supported a strong state role. This state-centered explanation is,
however, different from the market transition thesis (Lin, 1995).
The latter believed that rural development beneﬁted from market
transition and therefore the role of the market was more important
than that of the local state.
The gap in research on entrepreneurial governance in China
The thesis of entrepreneurial governance in general and local
corporatism in particular attributes China’s remarkable economic
growth and urban transformation to the institutions of governance.
For example, in rural areas, we see the development of specialized
towns and tourism-driven growth (Qian, Feng, & Zhu, 2012). Entre-
preneurial governance has been criticized for its negative impact
on the livelihood of residents through demolition and displace-
ment (Siu, 2007), environmental degradation, and excessive
inter-city and inter-region competition and market disorder (Zhu
& Hu, 2009). In the West, entrepreneurial governance has been
criticized as the threat to the democratic process of decision mak-
ing (MacLeod, 2011). But as a development approach, entrepre-
neurial governance has been regarded as powerful in terms of
economic achievement. The East Asian Miracle described by The
World Bank (1993) remains a myth about the combination of
entrepreneurial governance and developmental state in the pro-
motion of economic growth. The framework of the ‘developmental
state’ (Woo-Cumings, 1999; Olds & Yeung, 2004) is extensively
applied at the nation-state level. However, its operation at the local
level is not studied in detail. The literature of entrepreneurial gov-
ernance in China is more concerned with the city and its promotion
strategy (e.g. Chien, 2008, 2013; Wu, 2003; Xu & Yeh, 2005; Zhu,
2004). The problem of entrepreneurial governance, especially at
the lowest level of villages, has not been fully understood. The
ﬁnancial side has not been studied in the literature of entrepre-
neurial governance. In short, we have seen parallel development
of two groups of literature: the one on economic decentralization
and urban entrepreneurialism inspired by the Western studies
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MacLeod, 2011), and the other initially developed in rural China
as local corporatism (Oi, 1992, 1999) but has been further devel-
oped with a focus on property rights (Po, 2008) and local develop-
ment (Wei et al., 2007) and incentives given to local government
(Tao et al., 2010; Ye & Wu, 2014). It is thus very meaningful to
return to rural China to re-examine this thesis and to interrogate
the effectiveness of this approach of local entrepreneurialism.Research methodology
This research is part of a larger research project commissioned
by the municipality of Dongguan to examine economic restructur-
ing and rural ﬁnancial changes in Dongguan. The main project
lasted two years from 2012 to 2013, involving 12 Professors and
Associated Professors, 11 doctoral students, 33 Master’s students,
and 10 undergraduates. Extensive ﬁeldwork was conducted at
the city, town, village, and unit levels, including formal meetings,
semi-structured interviews, and a questionnaire survey. In total
the team visited 26 government departments, 12 towns and indus-
trial parks, and 5 case villages. Data obtained from individual vil-
lages and units were compiled in the ﬁnal report. This research
project led to a major multi-volume report submitted to the gov-
ernment of Dongguan. Because the main project is an applied pol-
icy project that covers a wide range of policies, it is not possible to
include detailed descriptive materials here. The current paper only
reports key ﬁndings from the case villages in which the data were
compiled from ﬁeldwork in the villages. The focus of the paper is
on the condition of village ﬁnance. The data are not typically avail-
able in statistical yearbooks, as the information is outside the scope
of conventional city-based statistics. The paper aims to identify the
scale of ﬁscal deﬁcit and the composition of income and expendi-
ture at the village level. The complex operation of village ﬁnance
should be left to other studies in the future. Some quotations are
used for the purpose of illustration rather than as systematic
evidence.The development stage of entrepreneurial governance in
Dongguan
Dongguan represents a typical phenomenon of bottom-up
urbanization in China. It shares some similarities with other
regions such as southern Jiangsu (sunan) (Chien, 2008; Shen &
Ma, 2005; Wei, 2002), such as ‘urbanization from below’, but has
a more decentralized pattern of growth (Shen et al., 2002). There
are four levels of governance: the municipality (city), towns, vil-
lages and units. A unique feature of governance in Dongguan is
the absence of district or county, typically between the municipal-
ity (city) and street ofﬁces (in urban areas) or towns (in rural
areas). To some extent, this represents a streamlined structure of
governance, with development focusing on towns, villages, and
units. The local governments at the town and village levels partic-
ipate directly in economic development and form close coalitions
with enterprises at their respective levels. This entrepreneurial
governance is quite versatile and ﬂexible, and has played an impor-
tant role in local economic growth. In this section, we review the
development stages of entrepreneurial governance.
Village local corporatism has experienced three stages of devel-
opment. The ﬁrst stage was from 1978 to 1995. In the ﬁrst stage,
Dongguan developed a village economy based on village enter-
prises that used spare village halls to attract inward investment.
Due to geographical proximity to Hong Kong and extensive social
ties, Dongguan pioneered the so-called ‘three supplies and one
compensation’ (sanlai yibu), which literally refers to supplies of
rawmaterials, equipment, and design from overseas, while villagesgain compensation for the use of local labor, land, and other logis-
tical costs (Lin, 2006). This is essentially a low risk and low value-
added processing economy, in which villages gain processing fees.
In this period, the local economy grew at an annual growth rate of
25.6%. Dongguan was thus industrialized but the driving force of
industrialization came from overseas investment.
The second stage ran from 1996 to 2007. This stage saw signif-
icant development of the rental economy. The municipal govern-
ment promulgated a series of regulations on land administration,
rural asset management, and rental housing management. Instead
of using spare village halls, villages managed to obtain loans from
banks to develop factory buildings to rent out to investors. At the
same time, villagers expanded their housing to accommodate rural
migrant workers and received signiﬁcant rental income from hous-
ing. The rental economy occupied a signiﬁcant proportion of village
income, typically 70% (Dongguan Statistical Bureau, 2008). Another
feature of this period was the development of specialized towns,
for example, Houjie town specialized in shoe making, Humen in
cloth, Chang’an in metal models, Dalang in the wool textile indus-
try, and Dalingshan in furniture. In contrast, township and village
enterprises (TVEs) declined because of the problem of ambiguous
property rights leading to ineffective management. The proﬁt rate
of rural collectives declined from 5.9% in 1985 to only 1.5% in 2006
(ibid.). Most TVEs went bankrupt. In this stage, the average annual
growth rate was still 21.7%. The second stage saw the strengthen-
ing of local governance. The city government strengthened land
and rental management. The town government strove to attract
inward investment. Industrial clusters and industrial parks started
to appear, while TVEs collapsed (Lin, 2006). The village and unit
levels experienced a boom in land development, either renting
out the land to investors or borrowing loans to build standard fac-
tory buildings. The rental economy was the main feature of this
period.
The third stage runs from 2008 to the present. In this stage, the
rental economy began to experience severe ﬁnancial difﬁculties.
Inﬂuenced by the global ﬁnancial crisis, the annual growth rate
of the Dongguan economy fell to 8.5%. The export-oriented econ-
omy, which was heavily dependent on the input of land, labor
and energy, reached its limit. This triggered a process of economic
restructuring. The provincial government accordingly proposed to
relocate migrant workers and industries to inner regions of the
province, under the policy of so-called ‘double relocations’ (shuang
zhuanyi). In addition, the provincial government developed a policy
of regenerating old villages, old factories and old urban neighbor-
hoods, or the so-called ‘three olds regeneration’ (sanjiu gaizao).
The city government proposed to abolish units, consolidate villages
and convert them into urban administrative units (street ofﬁces),
and reform rural collective shareholder companies (Po, 2008).
The city and town governments also raised the requirement for
inward investment and promoted the development of industrial
parks. The rental economy of villages and units was severely
affected by the global ﬁnancial crisis. With the collapse of factories
and the decrease in the number of migrant workers, the demand
for both industrial properties and housing declined. The rental
economy encountered serious difﬁculties. Rents of factory build-
ings declined from 15 Yuan per square meter to about 6 Yuan
per square meter, while the vacancy rate increased. This period is
characterized by economic restructuring and changing governance.
Village ﬁnance faced increasing debt and has found it difﬁcult to
fund public services. The city government strove to up-scale village
governance to city and town levels.
To sum up, the development of entrepreneurial governance in
Dongguan has experienced three stages: the ﬁrst stage is an initial
industrialization with overseas investment. In this stage entrepre-
neurial governance supported low value-added industries. The sec-
ond stage is the development of rental economies. With the
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the rental economy. Entrepreneurial governance was embodied
in the formation of village collectives. The third stage is an eco-
nomic crisis leading to a ﬁscal crisis in rural villages after the global
ﬁnancial crisis. The transformation of export-oriented production
plus the decline of rental income seriously damaged the ﬁnance
of the rural collectives that were the backbone of entrepreneurial
governance. In the next three sections, we will follow this process
to examine village debt problems.The creation of an economic crisis – declining rental incomes
As an export-oriented economy, Dongguan heavily relied on
rental income from industrial prosperities leased to overseas
investors and private rentals for rural migrants. For more devel-
oped parts of Dongguan, rural industries have been developed.
But in less developed areas, their economies almost exclusively
depend on rental incomes. The income of rural collectives comes
from the following sources: proﬁt from village-owned enterprises,
rental income from factory buildings, payments from contracting
agricultural work to rural migrants from other regions, and hous-
ing rent from rural migrants. The major source is rental income
from industrial properties. In 2011, property rents and manage-
ment fees in Dongguan reached 9.672 billion Yuan, accounting
for 70% of the rural collectives’ income, while direct proﬁt from
rural industries was only 1.338 billion Yuan, accounting for 9% of
the income of rural collectives (Dongguan Agricultural Bureau,
2012).
This study conducted a survey in four case villages. The result is
presented in Table 1, which shows the distribution of village
incomes. It can be seen that the income source varies. Some more
developed villages own village enterprises and thus have direct
income from these enterprises. Rental income occupies a relatively
lower proportion. For example, Nance village of Humen receives
38.1% of income directly from production proﬁts, 31.3% from rental
income, and 3% from government subsidies (for example, the gov-
ernment’s contribution towards the village land fund). Nance’s
condition is better because it receives more income from village
industries. For less developed villages, rental income is the primary
source of income. For example, for Chenwu and Chiling in Houjie
town, rental incomes accounted for 86% and 82% respectively.
For the poorest villages, such as Xiasha village in Shipai, they could
not even gain sufﬁcient rental income. Subsidies from upper level
governments became an important source, accounting for 27.5% of
income. From the table, it can also be seen that incomes fromman-
agement fees and operational incomes are limited. They usually
cover part of an operation but cannot fund the development cost.
In other words, the development of infrastructure and services
relies on cross-subsidies from renting out land and properties to
investors and housing to the rural migrant population.
The villages in Dongguan began to experience an economic cri-
sis because the rental economy was particularly vulnerable to eco-
nomic restructuring and ﬂuctuations. The rental economy
accommodated smaller and more labor-intensive enterprises in
the past, but recently these small enterprises have begun to move
out under the pressure of rising labor costs and land prices. An ofﬁ-
cial from the Bureau of Finance said, ‘‘Now the cost of building fac-
tories is higher, now the rental could not even cover the
operational cost, because many factories relocated to elsewhere,
and there are fewer demands for factory buildings’’ (Interview,
07 March, 2012). Over the past twenty years of economic develop-
ment, investment from overseas has gradually raised its demand
for space. Investors began to require a higher quality of space.
The original development pattern was ‘chaotic’; according to an
ofﬁcial in the planning bureau (Interview, 07 March, 2012), ‘‘Afterthe development of factories, we built roads and electricity and
water facilities, causing the mixture of villages and factories; the
enterprises attracted by villages and units were quite low ranked.’’
The rudimentary rural rental economy could not supply the new
quality space. Because of the lack of coordination, space under vil-
lage management became fragmented because many villages tried
to develop their own rental housing and rental industrial proper-
ties. The village economy lacked the capacity to attract larger
and more capital-intensive investment. Such a model of develop-
ment depends upon small enterprises as the customers of their
rental properties. Before the global ﬁnancial crisis, Dongguan had
already experienced a declining rental economy. The global ﬁnan-
cial crisis has accelerated the relocation of small labor-intensive
enterprises and reduced rental incomes. Moreover, under the
‘three supplies and one compensation’ model (Sit & Yang, 1997),
the villages only obtain processing fees. However, when smaller
enterprises grow into larger ones, or larger enterprises that are
wholly foreign-owned arrive, they stop paying fees to the local vil-
lage, because they now pay industrial and commercial taxes to the
city. Hence, the processes of economic restructuring and structural
upgrading both had negative impacts on village income. After the
global ﬁnancial crisis in 2008, Dongguan eventually saw the crea-
tion of a rural economic crisis.Public service spending under entrepreneurial governance
Although rental income has been declining in recent years in
Dongguan, its public service spending has been increasing. In
2011, rural collectives spent 5.751 billion Yuan on public services,
accounting for 58% of total expenditure (Dongguan Agricultural
Bureau, 2012). Other expenditures were on public security, sanita-
tion, and education, which are the major items in public service
spending. Public security spending was 984 million Yuan, account-
ing for 10% of the total expenditure. The Party Secretary of a village
in Zhongtang Town said, ‘‘Our village has to bear the salaries of
nearly 300 staff, including 150 security guards and 40 ofﬁce work-
ers’’ (Interview, Party Secretary, 20 March 2012). It can be seen
from these ﬁgures that the rural collectives bore signiﬁcant public
service spending.
Rural collectives undertook the costs of road construction,
schools, environmental protection, public security, education, san-
itation, family planning, social security, and support for veterans
and the families of deceased military persons. These costs
accounted for 44% of the net income of rural collectives between
2004 and 2007. In Humen Town, the pressure on village ﬁnance
is very high; according to the head of a village in the town,
‘‘I was the head of the enterprise ofﬁce. In the 1990s, there were
only three to four staff in the ofﬁce. But now there are more than
ten people. The payment for security is over 2 million Yuan, and
the sanitation cost increased from about 100,000 to 900,000 Yuan.
The cost is really high because under each branch of the upper gov-
ernment we have to deploy staff to cope with their requirement’’
(Interview, 22 March 2012). The problem is that the city has not
developed a public welfare system along with economic develop-
ment, but still relies on income drawn from the contributions of
rural collectives. The increase in public spending, however, did
not slow down. In 2011, spending on public services at the village
and unit levels increased by 34.3% compared with 2008. However,
net income grew by only 1.7% in the same period. Spending on
public services increased from 56% of net income to 73% of net
income, jeopardizing the upgrading of rural economies and their
future capacity for providing public services to residents.
To understand the signiﬁcant role of village collectives in public
service spending, one must examine the conﬁguration of village
governance. The organizational structure of village governance is
Table 1
The income composition of case villages in 2011 (unit: million Yuan). Source: ﬁeld investigation.
Category Nance village in Humen town Chenwu village in Houjie town Chiling village in Houjie town Xiasha village in Shipai town
Million yuan Amount Ratio (%) Amount Ratio (%) Amount Ratio (%) Amount Ratio (%)
Direct income from enterprises 57.94 38.11 0.00 0.00 3.70 3.34 0.00 0.00
Rental properties 47.51 31.25 37.81 85.97 91.68 82.86 2.28 33.53
Management income 29.66 19.51 3.09 7.03 0.08 0.07 0.88 12.94
Contracting out of agriculture 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.64 2.39 0.00 0.00
Other operational income 10.81 7.11 1.72 3.91 9.71 8.78 0.40 5.88
Income from school 2.50 1.64 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.21 3.09
Public security management fee 0.25 0.16 0.02 0.05 0.33 0.30 0.46 6.76
Sanitation management fee 1.21 0.80 1.34 3.05 0.20 0.18 0.70 10.29
All levels of subsidies 2.15 1.41 0.00 0.00 2.30 2.08 1.87 27.50
Total 152.03 100.00 43.98 100.00 110.64 100.00 6.80 100.00
Fig. 1. The structure of village governance.
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branches’ (yitao renma, sankuai paizi), which consists of the ‘‘villag-
ers’ committee’’, the party division, and the village collectives.
While the village collectives have some autonomy in economic
decision-making, they have to bear the cost of social expenditure.
According to the party secretary of BL town1, ‘‘The management of
village collectives is actually under the villagers’ committee. So the
head of the villagers’ committee needs to look after both enterprises
and the communities. The shareholders’ committee actually could
not monitor the operation of the enterprises effectively’’ (interview,
19 March, 2012). In order to respond to the requests of various gov-
ernment departments at the upper level, the village had to set up a
dozen divisions following the structure of the upper government.
This has increased administration costs (Fig. 1). Ironically, the origi-
nal purpose was to reduce the burden of welfare expenditure under
entrepreneurial governance. Economic devolution and governance
decentralization have led to the shift of the burden to the bottom
level of government. Through the creation of entrepreneurial gover-
nance, the government downloaded the responsibility for welfare
provision to the village.
According to the Chinese Constitution, the villagers’ committee
is not a level of government but rather a mass organization
(Lieberthal, 2005) under the principles of ‘‘self-management, self-
education and self-services.’’ But they have now become de facto
the lowest administrative unit. Under entrepreneurial governance,
the state and enterprises at the lowest level of governance form a
close relationship. In the process of rapid urbanization, the villages1 The name of the town is kept anonymous.have to take responsibility for developing infrastructure, providing
services, and managing security to cope with the increasing num-
ber of migrants in the village.
Interestingly, the increase in public service expenditure has also
been driven by the recent ‘democratization’ of governance and vil-
lage elections. In order to get elected, village cadres promise more
dividends to villagers during elections. The result is increasing div-
idends, regardless of the performance of village collectives. The
second largest item in village collectives’ expenditure was divi-
dends for shareholders, which reached 3.563 billion Yuan, account-
ing for 38% of total expenditure. The administrative reorganization
of village governance did not enhance the performance of rural
enterprises but rather had a detrimental effect on their viability.
In order to fulﬁll the promise of increasing dividends, some villages
even borrow money. The village collective has company status and
therefore can borrow money based on the expected rental income
from the banks.
The expenditure of the rural collective economy is mainly on
local public welfare and the direct operational costs of rural enter-
prises. We have studied village ﬁnance in detail through ﬁeldwork.
To take the example of Nance village of Humen, about 35.5% of
expenditure was for the construction of factory buildings and
maintenance, while 34.2% was used for providing local welfare,
including security guards, garbage collection, and school buses,
and 7.7% was allocated as dividends for shareholders. Other costs
included payments for social insurance, public security fees to
the government, land use fees paid to the land administration
bureau, and industrial and commercial taxes to the tax bureau.
Table 2 shows the detailed composition of expenditure in selected
villages interviewed in our study.
From Table 2, it can be seen that some villages bear very high
social expenditure; for example, for the poorer village, Xiasha in
Shipai town, 55.7% of expenditure was on public services. The vil-
lage has an income of 6.8 million Yuan, but spent 8.0 million Yuan
in 2011, creating a deﬁcit of 1.2 million Yuan. Compared with other
villages, this is a relatively poor village, which bears a much higher
burden of public service spending. Because of the close connection
between the local state and enterprises, rural enterprises could not
operate as fully independent agents and were subject to ‘predatory’
claims from the collective governance body (So, 2007). Our study
reveals that entrepreneurial governance has not developed a
proper funding source for public services and has thus laid down
the foundation of the predatory’ behavior of the local state. The
governance of the village cannot effectively resist the demand for
increasing dividends and spending in services regardless of the via-
bility of the collectives. Just like large cities that use land develop-
ment as a source to fund infrastructure development and ﬁll the
gap of ﬁscal gap (Tao et al., 2010), villages used their land assets
and rental properties to borrow money from the bank, creating a
hidden risk for public ﬁnance.
Table 2
The composition of expenditure in case villages in 2011 (unit: million Yuan). Source: ﬁeld investigation.
Category Nance village in Humen town Chenwu village in Houjie town Chiling village in Houjie town Xiasha village in Shipai town
Million yuan Amount Ratio (%) Amount Ratio (%) Amount Ratio (%) Amount Ratio (%)
Direct operational cost 51.39 35.53 0.00 0.00 0.37 0.32 0.00 0.00
Cost on rental properties 9.19 6.35 7.76 19.52 40.93 35.19 1.19 14.86
Tax 1.59 1.10 0.36 0.91 1.72 1.48 0.02 0.25
Management fees 7.42 5.13 4.30 11.82 9.39 8.07 1.58 19.73
Other operational cost 13.05 9.02 7.50 18.87 17.55 15.09 0.34 4.24
Public services 49.40 34.15 13.95 35.09 28.09 24.15 4.46 55.68
Remuneration for cadres 1.43 0.99 1.00 2.52 1.14 0.98 0.42 5.24
Dividend for villager shareholder 11.17 7.72 4.88 12.28 17.12 14.72 0.00 0.00
Total 144.64 100.00 39.75 100.00 116.31 100.00 8.01 100.00
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Fig. 2. The accumulation of village debt in Dongguan, 2000–2011. Source:
Dongguan Agricultural Bureau (2012).
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There are four levels of governance in Dongguan: municipality,
towns, villages and units (natural villages); the debt issue inFig. 3. The spatial distribution of village debt in DongguanDongguan mainly occurs at the village and unit levels. This is
because the municipality of Dongguan is relatively weak, lacks
the capacity for organizing large development projects, and there-
fore does not incur large quantities of borrowing. This was quite
different from the cities of Suzhou (Yang & Wang, 2008) and Kun-
shan (Chien, 2008, 2013) and Wuxi in southern Jiangsu, where the
municipalities organize large-scale land development to accom-
modate foreign investment. The Sino-Singapore Industrial Park
and Suzhou new district are typical mega urban projects (Yang &
Wang, 2008). On the other hand, Dongguan managed to download
responsibility for social services to the villages and thereby
reduced its ﬁnancial burden. As a result, villages bear an excessive
burden of social services and incur debts when income declines.
To understand the structure of villages and units, it is useful to
distinguish these two levels and their corresponding economic
entities. In Dongguan, there were 557 ‘joint economic co-opera-
tives’ (JECs) (jingji lianhe she) at the village level in 2011
(Dongguan Statistical Bureau, 2012). As suggested by the name,
these JECs are joined with 2526 ‘economic co-operatives’ (ECs) at
the unit (zu) level. The unit is a natural village representing the, 2011. Source: Dongguan Agricultural Bureau (2012).
Table 3
The asset values in Nance village of Humen town, 2002–2011 (in ‘000 Yuan). Source: ﬁeld investigation.
Year Nanchongkou Sanjiang Yuantou Baxingfang Xincun Pinggang Xidou Chongyuan
2002 270 170 110 660 730 1000 580 70
2003 650 110 40 100 900 813 670 900
2004 520 15 36 20 1094 319 949 977
2005 220 480 130 850 885 318 112 234
2006 20 1030 20 740 408 946 174 172
2007 42 94 340 698 493 1537 2972 974
2008 83 623 60 703 275 1322 832 3852
2009 692 626 48 175 200 40 2250 2650
2010 380 817 261 519 480 990 930 2860
2011 430 370 440 580 860 720 700 3320
16 D. Xue, F. Wu / Cities 43 (2015) 10–17physical cluster of rural households. In the socialist period, this
was the smallest level corresponding to the ‘production unit’. At
the unit level, there is no formal administrative structure. Several
natural villages can form an ‘administrative village’, which bears
some administrative functions to manage social services. In Guang-
dong, the administrative village is often simply referred to as the
‘village’. In this paper, JECs and ECs are also referred to as ‘rural col-
lectives’ because they represent the collective economy of the rural
area. The ﬁnancial problem discussed in this paper mainly refers to
these levels. Although the town is the lowest administrative level
and the village is not a level of government according to the Chi-
nese Constitution, the village is a de facto layer of government in
reality because of the degree of formalization and its administra-
tive duties.
As discussed earlier, despite rapid growth in the 1980s and
1990s, village debt has become a serious problem in Dongguan.
The problem started in 2000. Total debt at the village and unit lev-
els increased from 1.31 billion Yuan in 2000 to 2.80 billion Yuan in
2011 (Dongguan Agricultural Bureau, 2012) (see Fig. 2). Accompa-
nying the fast growth of village assets was the accumulation of
debt. In the period from 2000 to 2011, the average annual rate of
debt increase was 7.1%. The rapid growth of village debt was in fact
already occurring in 2004, at a rate of 15%. But in the same year vil-
lage assets also increased by 15.5% (ibid.). As a result, the debt issue
did not present as a serious problem at that time. In other words,
the rapid growth of the rural economy in the 2000s was driven
by village debt. This is a quite striking ﬁnding of our ﬁeld research.
At the village level alone (excluding the unit), about 60% of rural
collectives saw their expenditure exceeding their income. The def-
icit increased by 11.4% to 868 million Yuan in 2011. This ﬁgure rep-
resents an increase of 5.14 times from 2000.
In terms of the spatial distribution of debt, the pattern is
uneven. The poorer villages incur more serious debt problems,
and as discussed earlier they are more dependent upon rental
income without their own industrial capacities. Fig. 3 shows the
ratio of village debt to its asset value. The ﬁgure shows an aggre-
gated level of debt ratio by the towns. It can be seen that the cen-
tral area of Dongguan shows a lower debt ratio because it is
relatively well developed. The higher debt ratio is seen in the
towns adjacent to Shenzhen, such as Zhangmutou and Qingxi, per-
haps reﬂecting an earlier stage of industrialization. During that
time, investors were smaller, and when the land was used up
development was pushed more towards the inner region. The
ﬁgure also shows that village debt is a widespread problem, not
limited to one or two towns in Dongguan.
To investigate the situation of debt at the unit level, we selected
Nance village in Humen town for an in-depth study. The village is
actually a better-off case in Dongguan. From Table 3, we can see
that the asset values of units were all positive. In 2005, three units
in Nance village saw their debt exceeding their assets, causing neg-
ative equity. But the debt issue became more serious. By 2010, all
the units in the village of Nance had negative asset values. The unitof Chongyuan had the most serious debt problem, with debt
exceeding assets by more than 3.3 million Yuan. The lowest debt
was in Sanjiang, but it still owed 370,000 Yuan in 2011.
In sum, the ﬁgure and table both show that village debt has
become a serious problem and is widespread across villages in
the municipal region of Dongguan.Conclusion
This paper reveals an alarming problem—village debt—in a fast-
growing industrializing region of China. Against the background of
remarkable economic growth is the accumulation of debt. The cri-
sis experienced in Dongguan after the global ﬁnancial crisis in 2008
initially appeared as an economic crisis, but then became a ﬁscal
crisis. The crisis has its structural causes in entrepreneurial gover-
nance. The ﬁscal crisis at the village level is less well known and
has not been fully understood in the literature of Chinese urban
development (Duckett, 1998; Hsing, 2006; Oi, 1992, 1999; Po,
2008; Wu, Xu, & Yeh, 2007). In the literature of entrepreneurial
governance (Harvey, 1989; Jessop & Sum, 2000; Logan &
Molotch, 1987; MacLeod, 2011), the critique is mainly about the
negative social impact, the dominance of capital in the direction
of development and the weakening of democratic politics. This
paper reveals the problematic side of entrepreneurial governance
as a development approach. Under entrepreneurial governance,
rural collectives borrowed money from the bank for rental devel-
opment as well as the provision of public services. The enterprise
plays a signiﬁcant role in local governance. The tight association
of enterprises and the state in rural village governance is a feature
of this entrepreneurial governance, while in more advanced wes-
tern economies entrepreneurial governance is less directly seen
as the combination of state and market but rather as public and
private partnership (Jessop & Sum, 2000; MacLeod, 2011). How-
ever, although the borrower is not strictly a level of government,
because of this unique combination of rural collectives and govern-
ment, failing rural enterprises transformed an economic crisis into
a ﬁscal crisis, which will have severe impacts on public services if
these enterprises go bankrupt. Village debt exposes the limits of
‘entrepreneurial governance’ because the state does not provide
public services through public ﬁnance. In essence, under entrepre-
neurial governance, the government downloaded responsibility for
welfare provision to villages for them to fund their public services.
While policy makers attributed economic success to entrepreneur-
ial governance, this paper shows that there is a severe local ﬁscal
crisis. One original ﬁnding from this study is that the entrepreneur-
ial local state not only restrains the provision of social welfare but
also is not very successful as a development model because it is
susceptible to the impact and ﬁnancial risk of economic
restructuring.
This study has important policy implications. The government
of Guangdong did not attribute the ﬁscal crisis to entrepreneurial
D. Xue, F. Wu / Cities 43 (2015) 10–17 17governance but rather pragmatically the ‘burden of welfare’. The
former provincial party secretary Wang Yang referred to the ﬁnan-
cial crisis of Dongguan as the replication of the Greek crisis in
China. He said, ‘‘[If the village in Dongguan] continues to borrow
money to provide promised ‘welfare’, it will become Dongguan’s
Greece’’ (news.gd.sina.com.cn, 7 March 2012). But examining vil-
lage debt shows that Dongguan did not replicate a welfare state
model. The development of the Pearl River Delta to some extent
exempliﬁes the feature of the Chinese market-oriented approach
in which the local state formed close relations with market agents.
The welfare system has not been developed despite phenomenal
economic growth. The landscape of the Pearl River Delta after three
decades of economic development essentially remained the same,
as ‘manufacturing towns’ (Eng, 1997) characterized by local capi-
talism and deprivation of social welfare (Smart & Lin, 2007;
Smart & Smart, 1991, 2001). The crisis is not due to the welfare cost
of migrant workers. As shown in this paper, the privileged ‘rural
rentier class’ managed to capture the dividends of rural collectives.
This study shows that the ﬁscal crisis is derived from entrepre-
neurial governance, represented in rural areas in the early develop-
ment stage as ‘local state corporatism’ (Oi, 1992, 1999) and later
more widespread urban entrepreneurialism (Chien, 2013; Wu &
Phelps, 2011; Wu et al., 2007). This study suggests that village debt
is precisely an outcome of entrepreneurial governance rather than
‘excessive welfare’. The tension between different levels of govern-
ment has intensiﬁed this crisis (Yang, 2012). Therefore, to tackle
the ﬁscal crisis, the government has to develop proper public
ﬁnances beyond dependence on rental economies and using the
income of rural collectives to fund public services.
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